On international development and security: Some thoughts from the LIDS Symposium

How do international development and security interact with one another? Two panels at the LIDS Symposium looked at various dimensions that define the problem. The first examined the interplay between business development largely in the private sector and security. The second was addressed directly to humanitarian actors, and how security considerations affect their work. The panels were book-ended by two keynote speakers, Edith Quintrell of MIGA and Paul Brinkley of North America Western Asia Holdings (and formerly Deputy Undersecretary of Defense), who discussed how investors think about security concerns, and how we can catalyze development through careful interventions in the private sector that may have secondary effects on security.

Paul Brinkley, in his closing remarks, summed up some of the themes underlying the discussion throughout the day. Economic stability is a necessary condition for development. But without confidence in the security of an economy, foreign investment will not enter on its own, and as a consequence, a strong middle-class is unlikely to emerge. All the foreign aid in the world won’t, on it’s own, create a business environment conducive to investment and middle-class development—therefore, the security question needs to be addressed head-on.

Mr. Brinkley proposed a number of ways for approaching these problems. Many focused on providing incentives to bring foreign direct investment into regions typically too insecure to attract much investment on their own. Once the private sector arrives with some skin in the game, he argued, it will figure out how to prosper—bringing the development country’s economy along with it. Regardless of the merits of his particular solutions, Mr. Brinkley has a point: unless security can be maintained, developing countries will continue to struggle to improve their broader economic situations. Figuring out the most productive ways to encourage that security should be a primary focus of the development community moving forward.

A Contest for Fair Contests: Corruption in Sports

By: Ameya Naik

On 30th September, LIDS hosted a talk by Drago Kos, Chair of the OECD Working Group on Bribery. Mr. Kos delivered a fascinating lecture on the issue of corruption in sports, which he described as a rapidly-evolving and challenging area of work. The primary challenge for this area of work is the lack of any clearly defined jurisdiction, offences, or enforcing authorities – making most law enforcement measures taken against corruption in sports ad hoc and difficult to coordinate, even with the efforts of bodies like the Working Group.

Mr. Kos outlined two broad areas where corruption is most likely to emerge in relation to sporting events: bidding and event organisation, and betting on various aspects of games. Among the former, broadly speaking, the larger the scale of the sporting event, the greater the scope for corruption; recent developments with FIFA (or the Sochi Winter Olympics ensuring adequate snow despite unseasonably warm weather) have brought these manner of offenses into focus. The precise manner in which FIFA’s infamously sordid dealings – large kickbacks to national football associations, dispensing extravagant per diems in cash at conventions – found their way into U.S. jurisdiction is a fascinating story, hinging almost on a chance detail of some transactions: not atypical of the ad hoc nature of law enforcement in this field.

The area of betting and match-fixing is marked, if anything, by even greater ambiguity. First, there are stark differences between national laws, in terms of whether betting is legal, on what sports, by whom, and under what conditions. Second, there is the sheer nature of sport itself – the appeal of watching any sporting event is precisely the uncertainty of the outcome, so who can say if a given result is genuine or a result of corruption? Third, there are myriad opportunities for both: betting and match-fixing. One need not alter the course of an entire match or tournament – small details (which player or side scores first, or how much time it takes them to do so, the exact manner of play involved, and so on) can all be the subject of large bets. Finally, there is the nature of the financial networks involved – global in scope, and (somewhat unexpectedly) insulated from the better-known channels of shadow banking and underground finance.

Taken together, he noted by way of conclusion, these features make sports organisations a most lucrative business that remains drastically under-regulated by law: a highly attractive prospect for both legitimate and criminal enterprises, and to the wide range of actors who operate in the grey area between those (already far from clearly-defined) categories.

What do Singapore, Uzbekistan, Indonesia, and Switzerland have in common?

According to polling firm Gallup’s recently released Global Law and Order 2015 report, those countries are all among the top ten where people have the highest sense of personal security and the best experiences with law enforcement and crime.

As important as a sense of safety and law and order is for someone’s personal well-being, it also has broad societal implications in other ways.  This Friday, Harvard Law’s Law & International Development Society will be exploring one of those aspects:  development.  Panels including representatives from the World Bank and USAID, among other institutions, will be discussing business development in post-conflict areas and the dilemmas humanitarian actors face in high conflict areas.

The resulting discussions may help offer some insight into the significance of attitudes like those captured by Gallup.  The idea that a secure environment is an important part of building up a country’s economy may seem intuitive, but there are many unanswered questions.  Is there room for post-conflict states to utilize businesses’ tendency to see risk as opportunity?  Do security-side actors have a role to play in delivering development aid, or would such involvement place humanitarian actors at risk through a perceived loss of their impartiality?  If a country seeking to improve its residents’ well-being has limited resources, what proportion of those resources should it devote to which sectors?  Issues like these and others may be explored at the symposium, which will take place on Friday, October 16, from 12-7 PM in the Ames Courtroom at Harvard Law School’s Austin Hall.  A full schedule of events and list of speakers can be found here.

Low Regional Integration Slows Economic Growth in the MENA Region

Since the Arab Spring began in 2010, the Middle East North Africa region has had low economic growth. Although MENA has a relatively average GDP per capita compared with the rest of the world, this hides the vast inequality within countries and the variation between oil and non-oil countries in the region. One contributing factor to this is the low regional integration in MENA. Compared to other regions, the Middle East North Africa region not only has low regional integration with neighboring countries, but is also one of the least integrated in the world economy. MENA integration has been consistently increasing over time, but it remains far behind its potential. For example, while MENA is comprised of approximately 5.5% of the world’s population and 3.9% of the world’s GDP, MENA’s non-oil world trade, as of 2010, was only 1.8%. Moreover, during 2008 – 2010, MENA’s “intraregional exports of goods… averaged less than 8% of total exports,” while ASEAN averaged 25% and the EU averaged 66%.

There are several reasons for low regional integration in the MENA region. Political factors such as regime type, the lack of a hegemon, political instability and the organization of labor affect integration. Regimes with a highly centralized power center such as a dictator or monarchy are concerned only with staying in power. Integration would require giving up some sovereignty and would limit their ability to use any and all means to suppress domestic dissent. Dictators and monarchies often make instable regimes, especially with the onset of the Arab Spring, and thus, rulers are even less likely to enter into regional agreements with unstable partners. Lastly, labor is very constrained in MENA. In wealthy oil states, migrant laborers work for menial wages and, due to their migrant status, have no political rights or ways to organize. Organized labor is usually a driving force behind regional integration. If labor forces lack the ability to organize, then there is less incentive for governments to pursue an agenda that would limit their sovereignty. Unless laborers are granted more rights and governments began to listen to their people, there is no hope for regional integration in MENA.

Additionally, there are many economic factors that contribute to the lack of regional integration. In 2010, The World Bank again conducted a study on the lack of intraregional trade in MENA. The World Bank declared that some aspects of policy, such as public sector governance and participation, accountability and transparency, and rents and privileges, remained an obstacle to integration. The low levels of trade in the region are due partly to tariffs, but mostly to non-tariff issues such as include overvaluation of exchange rate, overregulation, labor restrictions, intellectual property rights, corruption, rules of origin, state intervention, and language and cultural barriers.

This low level of regional integration has contributed to the slow economic growth and high levels of unemployment in MENA. MENA has attempted to integrate several times over the past decades and has failed in almost every opportunity. Smaller regional agreements such as the one between the Gulf States and bilateral agreements have replaced an overall regional plan. The type of regime, corruption levels, and availability of oil in the region has led to concentrated wealth among the elite while the poor remain unemployed and unable to feed their families. Integrating the region will lead to lower levels of unemployment, higher wages, and more trade. While this is not the only way to help development and income inequality, it is one way to address these growing issues in the MENA region.

Africa, learn from Europe: The “afro” may not be a good look

By: Ted Brackemyre

When Qatar hosted the Fourth World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial Conference in Doha in November 2001, trade reform promised to better the lives of those both in the developed and the developing world. The Doha Ministerial kicked off the Doha Development Round negotiations—a round intended to provide less developed (LDCs) and developing countries more access to the benefits of the WTO regime. Fourteen years later the Doha Round lingers, unable to deliver significant gains to the developing world. The Bali Package, signed in 2013, offered some concessions to LDCs, but failed to provide the sort of meaningful changes envisioned of the Doha Round at the turn of the millennium. In December 2015, Kenya will host the Tenth WTO Ministerial Conference—the first African country to do so. However, with the Doha Round sputtering and little indication that the Kenya Ministerial will jumpstart negotiations, Africa may soon turn to its own reform—outside of the WTO system—to encourage development.
 
Further integration within the African Union (AU) is a possible source of growth. Established in 2002, the AU succeeds other pan-African integration efforts and models itself loosely off of the European Union (EU). Functioning as both a political and economic body, the AU’s plans to bring the entire continent into a single free trade area and customs union by 2019, a single market by 2023, and a single currency—colloquially called the afro—by 2028 present an ambitious economic integration agenda. Credit should be given to African leaders for not waiting on the developed world to get their act together, but growing support for monetary union in Africa is troubling.
 
Enthusiasm for a single African currency frequently awaits the promises of: 1) economic growth, 2) lower inflation, and 3) unity. First, a single market—with free internal trade and a single external tariff— and a single currency will foster economic growth. Trade within Africa will expand as tariff barriers and non-tariff barriers—e.g. the cost of exchanging different currencies—fall. Making cross border payments will be easier and, as a result, industries will develop at a regional and global level—boosting efficiency. Additionally, a single currency and the ability for that money to be used throughout the continent will attract more foreign direct investment (FDI). Increased FDI flows will improve the continent’s infrastructure—facilitating the development of a more modern economy. Second, monetary union assures lower inflation. With a larger transactions domain and a mandate to manage the monetary policy of all of Africa, the afro will be a less volatile money than its predecessors. The large number and diversity of national economies will engender faith in the afro—keeping inflation lower than before. Third, unity begets more unity. Akin to Frenchman Jean Monnet’s snowball theory of integration in mid twentieth century Europe, African leaders hope that taking small, easy steps—e.g. creating a free trade area—will allow states to witness the benefits of integration and support the undertaking of larger, more difficult steps—e.g. establishing fiscal or political union. Further, a monetarily unified Africa will be positioned better to combat many of the political disruptions that have long wrecked the continent. Economic sanctions and monetary restrictions will be effective, non-violent tools to combat violent coups and counter-coups when the entire continent operates within a single market and with a single money.
 
Proponents for a single African currency correctly identify many of the benefits of a shared money. The afro would lower transactions costs, facilitate pan-African monetary decision-making, and serve as a building block for greater African unity—both economic and otherwise. However, I caution against a hasty step to monetary union. As the EU has learned in recent years, managing a widely circulating single currency presents many challenges. Even assuming the AU has the institutional capacity to manage such a widespread currency, Africa—as an assembly of diverse economies—may not be suited for a stable, single money.
 
In particular, I worry about the disparity of macroeconomic policy preferences among African economies. Effective monetary policy requires that a money’s users share many of the same policy aims. Growth, inflation, and unemployment rates must roughly align with one another. Without alignment, monetary policy will be at best inadequate and at worst harmful. 
 
As a continent experiencing various stages of economic development and burdened with a history of inflationary episodes, it is unlikely that countries using the afro will share similar inflation and unemployment preferences. For instance, imagine a scenario in which a central African state needs to devalue—making its exports more competitive—in order to lower a growing unemployment rate. At the same time, though, a southern African country faces inflationary pressures and demands retractionary monetary policy to avoid an inflation crisis. Monetary policy could help resolve either problem—just not the same monetary policy. The central state seeks lower interest rates and an expansion in the money supply, while the southern state needs higher interest rates and a retraction in the money supply. Such is the key tension in supranational monetary policymaking. The African Central Bank cannot service both countries’ needs. Either one, or both, will be left with policy that actually worsens their problems. While this scenario is hypothetical in the case of the afro, it is very real in the case of the euro. With its history of hyperinflation and robust economic output, Germany prefers low inflation at the expense of relatively higher unemployment. Meanwhile, the sputtering Greek economy is willing to trade high inflation for a boost to GDP and a reduction in unemployment. Sitting in Frankfurt, the European Central Bank (ECB) traditionally favors the northern European approach of German-style low inflation at the expense of its southern brethren. Now, Greece is on the verge of default and an exit from the eurozone that threatens the stability of the entire union. It is not hard to imagine a similar situation playing out in the afrozone.
 
The problem of divergent policy preferences cannot be addressed solely through firm government commitments to the shared money. German responses to Greek cries for easy money often chastise the Greek government for irresponsible spending and poor economic structuring. The AU could protect against such poor governance with stronger commitments to low inflation rates, public debts, and deficits. However, even with those protections, the diversity of African economies will tear the single money apart. In developing countries, gross domestic product (GDP) fluctuates greatly on a yearly or even quarterly basis. Particularly in Africa, where commodity export prices heavily dictate economic performance, predictable GDP growth is unlikely. Even with a firm commitment to similar inflation policies, global economic forces may force a divergence. Envision a year in which gold and diamond prices skyrocket, but crude oil prices plummet. Gold and diamond producing countries will experience an inflow of cash, higher prices, and less unemployment. Oil producing countries will experience a decrease in national wealth, lower prices, and an increase in unemployment. All of a sudden, Africa’s gold and diamond exporters are feeling German and the oil producers Greek. In other words, from an entirely external source, the stability of the afro is disrupted. This example is purposefully over-simplified, but the point stands: both nationally, and as a collective economy, Africa lacks the diversity of industrial output necessary to combat adverse external shocks. It is not a matter of it, but a matter of when greater economic trends pull the African economies apart. Under such conditions, a stable, single money cannot exist.
 
Ultimately, the choice for Africa to enter into a monetary union is a trade-off. But, that trade-off is rather one-sided. The benefits of a single money are real—however, so are the costs. The diversity and natural wealth of Africa provide significant economic promise for the continent, but they make a single money an unwise endeavor. The afro is ambitious and the idea of greater African integration is not inherently bad. Nevertheless, Africa is not nearly ready for this new look. Besides being an ill-suited collection of economies for a single money, monetary union would put Africa in an awkward middle phase of integration. The afro would not be a natural monetary union in the sense that a stable system would require significant fiscal transfers to stabilize regional disparities and respond to adverse shocks. Fiscal transfers require fiscal revenues—i.e. taxes. And, taxation necessitates some form of political union. In essence, imposing a single money on Africa is really just the first step in creating a pan-African political union. Advocates of the afro will argue that is not the case, but they are either short-sighted or deceptive. The recent troubles in European integration portend Africa’s future if it pursues deeper integration. As the eurozone added more varied economies to its portfolio, the euro became increasingly difficult to manage. Africa’s economies are arguably more dissimilar than Europe’s. The only way to keep such a monetary union together would be fiscal—and then political—union. If Africa is not ready for total political union—it’s not—then monetary union is a troubling step.
 
Proposals for monetary union are attractive because facially they appeal to notions of unity and ambition. This type of multilateral governance is sexy because the tough choices are left to be made at local and national levels. The negative effects of a poorly instituted monetary system will be felt first by local and national governments. Only later will the supranational regime bear the blame. If the AU moves forwards with monetary integration it will have to do so alongside serious domestic institutional reform. Corruption, irresponsible spending, and other forms of poor governance will cripple the afro before it ever circulates. Combating poor governance is not easy and it may be impossible to garner local support for supranational integration, while simultaneously advocating for local governance reforms. African leaders should also look to the troubles facing other multilateral endeavors. The WTO, for instance, has failed to fully assimilate developing countries partially because of its many member states and the wide variety of interests they represent. A pan-African monetary union would—in many ways—re-create that problem. Effective monetary policy would be difficult to institute when required to cover so many interests. Similarly, the AU in many respects patterns itself off of the EU. As such, the AU should be especially cognizant of the EU’s growing pains. The AU may want to consider limiting membership—or at least membership to the afrozone—to economies that are intrinsically similar. The eurozone’s Maastricht criteria attempt to do so, but focus solely on inflation, debts, and deficits. Moreover, the eurozone frequently relaxed the Maastricht criteria. Afrozone membership criteria should focus on growth, inflation, and unemployment rates, in addition to public debts and deficits—and do so more strictly. Alternatively, the AU should consider breaking down into regional agreements for deeper integration. Free trade may be able to be negotiated at an Africa-wide level, but for governance areas that demand flexibility and political accountability—e.g. monetary and fiscal union—the regional level is more appropriate.
 
Regional monetary governance offers a solution that avoids many of the difficulties of a continent-wide currency. At the regional level, monetary policy can be tailored precisely—taking into account regional preferences, business cycles, and external shocks. The West Africa CFA franc and the Central Africa CFA franc currently operate as regional currency unions. Additionally, the Common Monetary Area links several currencies in southern Africa to the South African rand. These institutions are not perfect, but they demonstrate a willingness and an ability of African leaders to think creatively about regional governance solutions. These efforts should serve as examples as those same leaders seek to develop their own solutions—i.e. not relying on the WTO and other western-centric regimes—to their continent’s development problems. The recent trend of African countries looking inward for development solutions is encouraging. But, African integration efforts must avoid the mistakes of Europe. Without strong, unified fiscal and political leadership, assembling diverse economies with varied monetary policy needs is a nearly impossible task. Monetary integration and reform can play a key role in attempts at spurring development, but now—more so than pan-African unity—African economies need the flexibility and national and regional-level monetary policymaking.

Power, Politics, and Provinces: Découpage in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

One trend in human rights and development activism seems to be “think local,” perhaps a reflection of a desire to side-step often distant, corruption-prone federal governments and instead foster empowerment in traditionally marginalized areas.  It’s an idea that makes some sense—but can be dangerously over-extended or co-opted.
 
Such is currently the case in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where President Joseph Kabila, constitutionally prohibited from seeking a third term, is currently searching for a way to prolong his tenure.  Having been forced in January to back down from a census law that would have postponed the election—due to be held in November 2016—he’s now returned to an idea that was supposed to be implemented a long time ago:  découpage.  This process would divide the DRC’s eleven provinces into twenty-six, a change which was set in motion in 2006 and that was supposed to have occurred by 2010.  Given all the delay, why has Kabila suddenly set a June 30 deadline to institute découpage, despite numerous reports indicating the Congolese government is underprepared?  Likely because he sees it as an alternate way to maintain power—and because, whether or not the June 30 deadline is met, he wins.
 
If découpage actually—and surprisingly—manages to take place before June 30, Kabila will have succeeded in dissolving the large provincial power bases of some of his primary rivals who, even if elected to lead their new, smaller provinces, will have fewer resources at their disposal and therefore be less viable candidates at the national level.  As a result, Kabila’s opponents would be less able to rally against any power grab and less able to challenge any anointed successor.  On the other hand, if DRC can’t meet the June 30 deadline, the elections may be delayed, allowing Kabila to hold onto the presidency.
 
Further dividing up DRC’s provinces, and potentially engaging in general decentralization efforts, isn’t necessarily an inherently bad idea, though there should be real concerns about how it would play out in DRC given the country’s past experiments with it.  However, even if one supports the end goal, the timing of this particular process should create real concerns about any already fragile hopes of shifting DRC in a more truly democratic direction.  After so many years of delays, waiting a little bit longer seems like a much better option than rushing into a sloppy, politicized process.