The Freedom of Information, Development, and LIDS Global’s 2014-2015 Research Project

Transparency is a foundational element of development—without it, the citizens of emerging economies cannot participate in keeping their governments and markets fair and accountable. Of course, governments and market participants are also entitled to a measure of privacy. The trick is in finding the balance, both in substantive law and in fact. In 2014-2015, LIDS Global is going to organize an international research effort to explore this balance.

LIDS Global, as was noted in this blog just a few weeks ago, is this organization’s effort to build partnerships with like-minded student groups all around the world. Our 2013-2014 pilot project was highly successful; LIDS Global coordinated teams from around the world as they explored the link between corruption and development. The finished work will be published later this month.

Building on this success, our 2014-2015 research will focus on the Freedom of Information and its role in development; specifically, how can citizens all around the world use Freedom of Information laws to deter corruption in government officials? In fact, our idea to explore this topic is partly a result of the 2013-2014 research: students from the Centre for the Study of Human Rights at the University of Colombo in Sri Lanka identified the Freedom of Information as a top development priority in the Asian region.

Here at Harvard, others were also focused on this key element. Professor Matthew Stephenson’s Global Anticorruption Blog published several posts that called for using the Freedom of Information to deter corruption on the “demand” side (meaning the government officials that demand bribes in the first place, as opposed to the “supply” of the businesses that pay for them).

One post, written by Argentine legal scholar Ignacio Boulin-Victoria (LLM ’14), provocatively proposed using Freedom of Information laws in developed countries to extract information about corrupt “demand-side” officials that could be used to shame or prosecute them in their home countries. The rationale here is simple: prosecuting agencies in the United States, for instance, come to possess information in the course of a corruption prosecution that could also be used to clean up government and markets in developing countries. Why not get that information to people who can use it, such as civil society and prosecutors in those developing countries?

Imagine, for instance, that the Department of Justice has successfully prosecuted a major multinational telecom company for bribes paid in several Eastern European nations. The telecom company has already settled with the DOJ and paid its fine; presumably it and its peers are now deterred from making future bribes in those countries. But what happened to the corrupt officials that demanded the bribes in the first place? Oftentimes, nothing happens to them—they simply continue demanding bribes until another MNC pays them.

Why aren’t the corrupt officials punished for their actions? Mr. Boulin-Victoria believes that one big reason is that, even though the DOJ may pass information off to the prosecuting agency in the “demand-side” country, there is simply not enough pressure on that agency to bring a case against government officials in its own country. Mr. Boulin-Victoria argues that, if only civil society in that country were empowered with the same information that the DOJ has, then the citizens of that country could be empowered to hold their own government officials accountable—and their prosecutors.

If a lack of information to civil society in the “demand-side” country is the problem, then civil society in developed nations can help by extracting the key information and then simply passing it off to their foreign counterparts. Seems simple, right?

As Mr. Boulin-Victoria and others on the Global Anticorruption Blog acknowledge, however, this plan is not without potential flaws. Most obviously, if prosecutors in a “demand-side” country do not respond to public pressure, or if public pressure does not materialize, then nothing new will come of this plan. For instance, using the example of the DOJ’s prosecution of an telecom-MNC in Eastern Europe, it is not immediately obvious that passing information about corrupt officials to civil society in those countries will actually yield high-level prosecutions—citizens in those countries may already be aware that their government officials are corrupt, journalists and private attorneys may be easily intimidated by defamation laws, and prosecutors may be completely captured in any case. Another problem: what if the DOJ doesn’t give up the information, citing an exception to the Freedom of Information Act?

LIDS Global, now coming into its second year, is perfectly suited to explore this proposal. Our network of student groups in several nations around the world enables us to understand legal and social conditions “on the ground.” Here in the U.S., our LIDS Global team will research Freedom of Information Act implications of this plan, and potentially develop a “tool-kit” for U.S. attorneys to use if they actually wanted to test this plan out.

It’s going to be an exciting year for LIDS Global and its partners!

Rethinking Kiobel: Is there room for human rights in anticorruption enforcement?

April 21, 2014 – Maryum Jordan

This post was originally published in the Global Anticorruption Blog, an exciting new initiative by Harvard Law School professor, and LIDS mentor, Matthew Stephenson. Six current and former LIDS members–Rajarshi Banerjee, Daniel Holman, Maryum Jordan, Meng Lu, Philip Underwood, and Colette van der Ven–are contributors to the Blog. LIDS Live will post brief introductions to their posts, and direct you to the Blog to read the rest.

It is the one-year anniversary of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. In its decision, the Court narrowed the admissibility of Alien Tort Statute (ATS) claims related to extraterritorial human rights abuses, ruling that such claims are not actionable unless the claim has a sufficient nexus to U.S. territory. What kind of nexus is enough for an ATS case arising from exterritorial conduct? For cases involving foreign multinational companies, such as the defendant Royal Dutch Petroleum in Kiobel, a “mere corporate presence” in the U.S. is not enough.

A striking feature of this holding is the clear contrast between how a “mere corporate presence” in the U.S. is not enough for an ATS claim based on extraterritorial conduct, but is sufficient for a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) prosecution. Although Royal Dutch Petroleum’s “mere corporate presence” in the U.S. was not a sufficient basis for an ATS claim, if these human rights abuses were tied to corruption for the retention or solicitation of business in Nigeria (and involved U.S. interstate commerce — a requirement not difficult for the DOJ and SEC to overcome), Royal Dutch Petroleum could be liable for FCPA violations. As a foreign multinational company, Royal Dutch Shell Company lists its shares on the New York Stock Exchange and prepares filings for the SEC. Such activity is sufficient for establishing FCPA jurisdiction.

This suggests a possible strategy for human rights advocates dismayed by the Kiobel decision: Perhaps it might be possible to more aggressively utilize FCPA enforcement for circumstances in which corporate accountability for human rights abuses is tied to bribery. Continue reading →

LIDS Advisory Board Member to Teach HLS Course on Anti-Corruption

This fall, LIDS Advisory Board Member  El Cid Butuyan will be teaching a seminar on “Transnational Corruption” at Harvard Law School.  Mr. Butuyan’s work as a Senior Litigator for the Integrity Vice Presidency of the World Bank and background managing high level anti-corruption prosecutions in the Philippines allow him to draw upon a wealth of personal experience in teaching the course.  LIDS encourages members with an interest in the topics of anti-corruption regulation, enforcement, and policy issues to consider joining the course!  Non-HLS students may be eligible to cross-register according to applicable procedures.  The court catalog description follows.

Transnational Corruption – Fall 2014 Seminar

Mr. El Cid Butuyan | Th 3:00pm – 5:00pm | 2 classroom credits

“This course will explore the emergence of the global anti-corruption movement and will provide students with: a brief overview of the trends in the burgeoning field of anti-corruption enforcement including various global norms on the subject; the work of select regulatory and enforcement authorities and international and multilateral institutions; and the day-to-day lawyering skills required of practitioners. Through readings, lectures, case studies, class discussions, and potential guest speakers, the course aims to introduce students to significant substantive and practical issues in international anti-corruption work and the fundamentals required for a future career in this exciting field.”

US Moves to Freeze and Seize Nigerian Dictator Abacha’s Assets–But Who Will Get the Money?

This post was originally published in the Global Anticorruption Blog, an exciting new initiative by Harvard Law School professor, and LIDS mentor, Matthew Stephenson. Six current and former LIDS members–Rajarshi Banerjee, Daniel Holman, Maryum Jordan, Meng Lu, Philip Underwood, and Colette van der Ven–are contributors to the Blog. LIDS Live will post brief introductions to their posts, and direct you to the Blog to read the rest.

By Rajarshi Banerjee

Last week, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) announced that it had frozen about $458 million in corruption proceeds that former Nigerian dictator Sani Abacha and his conspirators allegedly embezzled from Nigeria’s central bank, laundered through U.S. financial institutions, and deposited in bank accounts around the world. The freeze is a first step in the DOJ’s largest-ever forfeiture action under its recent Kleptocracy Asset Recovery Initiative (KARI).  There is much to say about this development, but the question that most immediately comes to my mind (and likely many Nigerians’ minds) is: What will the DOJ do with all this money? Continue reading on the Global Anticorruption Blog →

India’s Politics of Anti-Corruption

Jan. 16, 2014 – Raj Banerjee

Just last month, something incredible happened in Indian politics. The Aam Aadmi Party (AAP), a year-old political outfit borne out of a massive anti-corruption movement, took charge of the city-state of Delhi, home to India’s capital. Aam Aadmi means “common man” in Hindi; the acronym “AAP” means “you.” AAP’s leader, Arvind Kejriwal, a 45 year-old former engineer and tax man, spent much of 2013 pitting his common man persona against Delhi’s entrenched political leaders. Now, he finds himself the chief minister of Delhi.

AAP’s remarkable success and soaring popularity have shaken Indian politics, because they have highlighted a powerful anti-corruption sentiment across the country. At the same time, AAP struggles to define and mold that anti-corruption sentiment. This should not be a surprise to anybody who has studied corruption –academics still struggle to construct a working definition; and what is corrupt behavior often depends as much on the context as the act. AAP’s vision of a corruption-free India requires going after petty policeman and government officials, high-ranking bureaucrats and politicians, and businesses big and small. That is a lot of enemies for a fledgling political party to make. At the same time, if AAP picks its targets strategically, it will fall afoul of its own absolutist anti-corruption manifesto.

Add to this the complications of politics and governance. Despite its success in Delhi, AAP does not hold the majority of seats in the state 70 member legislative assembly. To survive, the Delhi AAP government relies on the Congress party; and as a young party, AAP needs its government in Delhi to show the country that it can deliver on its promises. At the same time, AAP cannot go soft on corrupt Congress leaders in Delhi, especially given how highly critical it has been of that corruption scandal-ridden party.

The month-old AAP government in Delhi must also realize that what makes for a good, populist movement does not necessarily make for sound policy. Mr. Kejriwal recently declared that Delhi would not allow foreign multi-brand retailers (such as Wal-Mart) to set up shop in his state. This policy has nothing to do with corruption. It was meant to be a handout to small local retailers, a large number of whom supported AAP in the Delhi elections. However, it leaves the large Delhi retail market open to massive Indian retailers, who can do just as much damage to small business. Mr. Kejriwal’s announcement also cuts against his own anti-corruption stance, as it benefits local companies subject to far less extensive corporate integrity and anti-corruption safeguards than their large Western counterparts.

AAP has done a remarkable job tapping into India’s anti-corruption sentiment. It continues to enjoy tremendous support across the country, and is growing beyond Delhi. Other anti-corruption movements and political parties around the world should take notice of its success. Nevertheless, the party will find it incredibly challenging to shape its anti-corruption vision from a position of power.